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Canadian reports have recommended that health as a human right must be Canada’s overarching global
commitment and that the primacy of human rights should be prioritized over other elements of international law
including international trade and investment law as it applies to access to pharmaceuticals. This paper uses a series
of case reports to examine Canada’s commitment to this goal. Specifically it examines cases where improved access
has been in conflict with increased intellectual property rights. The 6 cases are: Canada’s position when 39
pharmaceutical companies took South Africa to court in 1998 over its legislation to allow parallel importation of
patented medicines and to regulate the price of medications; the stance that Canada took in the negotiations
around the Doha Declaration in 2001; the passage of Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime in 2004 and
subsequent attempts to amend the legislation in 2011 and 2012; Canada’s involvement in the final
declaration at the United Nations High-Level meeting on non-communicable diseases in 2012; Canada’s views
about the terms in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement as expressed in 2009; and Canada’s 2013
position on the extension of the exemption for least developed countries from having to comply with the
terms of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. In the first case Canada was
neutral but in the remaining 5 cases Canada prioritized intellectual property rights over access. This position
is consistent with how Canada has acted around domestic issues involving intellectual property rights for
pharmaceutical products. Canada has supported strengthened rights despite the fact that their touted
benefits have not been realized either domestically or in developing countries. As a result Canada has failed in its
humanitarian duty to protect the human right to health in the form of safe and low cost medicines for the people
in developing countries.
Keywords: Access, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Canada, Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime, Doha
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Mean per capita expenditure on pharmaceuticals in low-
income countries is just over US $20 per annum, [1] and
in some of these countries purchasing basic medications
such as salbutamol for asthma or the antibiotic amoxicillin
would push up to 86% of the population of the country
below a daily income of USD $1.25 [2]. Average public sec-
tor availability of even low cost generic medicines ranges
from just 29.4% to 54.4% across 36 low- and middle-
income countries [3]. Under these circumstances it wouldCorrespondence: jlexchin@yorku.ca
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orseem that it’s a moral imperative for Canada to strongly
support improved access to medicines in the developing
world. This requirement was recognized in a report by a
research consortium for the Romanow Commission, a
federally appointed commission looking at the future of
health care in Canada, on the subject of Canada and
health care in a globalized world. In this report the resear-
chers contended that health as a human right must be
Canada’s overarching global commitment and the primacy
of human rights should be prioritized over other elements
of international law, including international trade and
investment law as it applies to access to pharmaceuticals
[4]. In his final report Romanow was quite clear that “it is
time for Canada to use both its positive relationship with
developing countries and its considerable expertise inThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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the world” [5].
Articles 12 and 2 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which Canada has
both signed and ratified, commits countries to recog-
nizing “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health” (Article 12) and “to take steps…through inter-
national assistance and co-operation…with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant” (Article 2) [6].
Finally, in the past Canada used patent legislation to
protect its own population from high drug costs. A
series of government reports in the 1960s found that
Canadian drug prices were among the highest in the
world and identified the monopoly granted by patents as
being the primary reason for the prices. In response,
Canada modified its patent act to allow for compulsory
licensing to import generic products. The result was a
significant expansion of the domestic generic industry
and a substantial overall saving in the cost of prescrip-
tion drugs [7]. Given its own past history Canada might
have been expected to be sympathetic to the need for
developing countries to provide their people with afford-
able medications.
This paper uses 6 case studies to explore whether this
aspirational goal of helping developing countries to im-
prove health and healthcare has actually been reflected
in Canadian policy and examines the political ideology
driving the decisions that Canada has made. Whether
these decisions have had an effect on international orga-
nizations such as the World Trade Organization or with
respect to what other countries have done is outside the
scope of this paper. Specifically this article examines
instances where improved access to safe and low cost
drugs in developing countries has come into conflict
with support for intellectual property rights (IPRs).
These instances were identified by reading material on
the following web sites: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal
Network <http://www.aidslaw.ca/EN/>, Health Action
International <http://www.haiweb.org>, Knowledge
Ecology International <keionline.org>, Oxfam Canada
<http://www.oxfam.ca>, Oxfam International <http://
www.oxfam.org>, Pharmaceutical Policy Research Col-
laboration <http://www.pharmaceuticalpolicy.ca>, Univer-
sities Allied for Essential Medicines <uaem.org>, Wemos
<http://www.wemos.nl/Eng/>, World Health Organization
(Intellectual Property) <http://www.who.int/topics/
intellectual_property/en/> and World Trade Organiza-
tion (TRIPS) <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
trips_e.htm>. The paper concludes by examining
whether support for IPRs is justified given the lack
of evidence of their positive benefits for developing
countries.Discussion
South Africa versus the drug companies
With the culmination of the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations in 1994, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) came into existence on January 1, 1995 and with
it the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, one of the 3 core agreements
overseen by the organization. (The other two are the
General Agreement on Trade in Services and the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.) All WTO
member states must agree to abide by the terms of these
3 agreements. The TRIPS Agreement harmonized patent
terms world-wide for a minimum of 20 years from the
time that the patent application was made and mandated
the granting of patents in all fields of technology inclu-
ding pharmaceuticals. Before TRIPS many developing
countries either did not grant patents for pharmaceuti-
cals or only granted patents on the process used to make
the medication [8]. As there are usually many ways of
making a medication, lower cost generic versions of
medications were quickly available in countries with an
active generic industry like India and Indian generics
were then available for export to countries that did not
grant patents on pharmaceuticals [9]. Following TRIPS,
this pathway to making generics available was going to
be severely curtailed by 2005, the time when developing
countries had to accede to TRIPS. As a result, as the
AIDS crisis exploded, by 2000 many of these countries
were confronting a situation where the price for triple
therapy for HIV was greater than USD $10,000 per per-
son per year and the ability to access low cost generics
was going to disappear in the near future [10].
Faced with increasing rates of HIV infection and these
prices for HIV treatment, in the late 1990s the South
African government passed the Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act that allowed for
generic substitution of off-patent medicines, transparent
pricing for all medicines, and the parallel importation of
patented medicines. In response, in 1998 39 multina-
tional pharmaceutical companies, with the support of
the United States (US) government and the European
Commission, took the South African government to court
alleging that the legislation violated both the TRIPS
Agreement and the country’s constitution. Eventually, in
the face of widespread public opposition the US govern-
ment withdrew its support for the court case and without
the US support the companies dropped their lawsuit [11].
Canada’s position was that intellectual property should be
“a balance between the need to provide incentives to spur
innovation and the benefits derived by society to have
maximum access to new creations” [12]. Canada did not
support the US but it also did not affirm the right of the
South African government to take the steps that it did
[4]. Although the position that Canada took during this
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position is indicative of Canada’s ambivalent stance
between what should happen in the domestic and inter-
national spheres. At the same time that Canada was
staying neutral in the South African case, it was also
defending Canadian legislation, arguing that provisions
in the TRIPS agreement “call for a liberal interpret-
ation…so that governments would have the necessary
flexibility to adjust patent rights to maintain the desired
balance with other important national policies” [13].
This dichotomy between domestic and international
positions is further highlighted in the next section.
Canada and the Doha Declaration
In the preparations for the WTO Ministerial meeting in
Doha in November 2001, Canada sided with Australia,
Japan, Switzerland and the US in opposing a proposed
resolution that would affirm that nothing in the TRIPS
Agreement prevents WTO members from adopting
measures to protect public health [4]. During the actual
meeting Canada did reverse its position and ended up
supporting the Doha Declaration that prioritized public
health over trade. Some observers contend that the
Canadian attitude changed in order to avoid interna-
tional embarrassment. A month earlier, Canada had
threatened to violate Bayer’s intellectual property rights
if the company was unable to provide enough ciproflox-
acin to protect the Canadian population in the event of
a widespread anthrax attack and demanded a price re-
duction in ciprofloxacin from Bayer [14].
One of the key provisions of the Doha Declaration was
that it reaffirmed the article in TRIPS stating that coun-
tries could issue compulsory licenses for medications.
Additionally, the Doha Declaration made it clear that in
emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency,
countries could choose to waive the normal requirement
to first attempt to negotiate a voluntary license on reaso-
nable terms and conditions for a reasonable period of
time. A compulsory license allows for the production of
generic versions of a medication even while the product
is still protected by patents. However, generic production
had to be predominantly for domestic consumption leav-
ing the problem of providing low cost generic medicines
for countries that lacked the facilities for domestic generic
manufacturing. It took another two years of difficult
negotiations before the WTO members, meeting in the
WTO General Council, reached an agreement, the so-
called “August 30, 2003” decision, on how to resolve this
issue [8]. In the run-up to this final resolution, developed
countries offered two significantly different proposals. The
European Union (EU) proposed a solution that would
provide limited exceptions to patent rules that hindered
the export of drugs under a compulsory license while the
US backed a time-limited, conditional moratorium onWTO challenges to such exports. In general, developing
countries saw the EU initiative as a positive step although
there were certain elements that they were concerned
about, whereas the reaction to the US proposal was ge-
nerally negative since it didn’t offer a permanent solution
to the problem. Canada backed the much more restrictive
US position over the one put forward by the EU [15]
and maintained its backing for months as negotiations
progressed.
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime
Once the compromise around compulsory licensing was
reached, Canada passed Bill C-9 in May 2004 thereby
becoming the first country to pass legislation allowing
for the production and export of generic drugs to coun-
tries that lacked their own manufacturing capacity. The
chain of events that triggered this legislation included a
speech in September 2003 by Stephen Lewis, then the
United Nations special envoy to Africa for HIV/AIDS,
and the desire of Jean Chretien, then prime minister of
Canada, to leave a legacy [16]. (The legislation, now
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR), was
initially called the Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa.) How-
ever, the compromises in the legislation made the act
largely unworkable. “Policy debates were dominated by
two themes overall: intellectual property rights and
TRIPS compliance…With the Departments of Industry
Canada and International Trade as the lead institutions,
the goals of protecting intellectual property and ensuring
good trade relations with the United States appear to
have taken priority over encouraging generic compe-
tition to achieve drug affordability” [17]. Among the flaws
in the legislation were: the limited list of pharmaceutical
products that were eligible for export, limitations on what
countries a drug could be exported to, a short duration
for a compulsory license authorizing the export of a gen-
eric, significant administrative roadblocks, a compulsory
license could only be issued after advance disclosure to
the patent-holder of the name of the proposed recipient
country, a fixed “maximum quantity” of the product to be
exported in generic form and the fact that “a generic
manufacturer had to file a [separate] application for every
drug, for every amount produced and for every country to
which it wanted to export a drug” [18].
Built into the legislation was the requirement for a
review after three years. By April 2007 when the review
took place, the Conservatives had replaced the Liberals
as the government of Canada. At this time, CAMR had
never been employed. (Subsequently, the legislation was
used to send a shipment of antiretroviral drugs to
Rwanda [19]). In the initial Parliamentary debates in
2004 about CAMR there was almost no mention about
promoting the right to health through access to essential
medicines or the need to deal with neglected diseases,
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Parliamentary review [17]. While the Liberal government
was primarily focused on protecting IPRs, it was not
aggressively pushing this stance in its foreign policy deal-
ings with developing countries. This position changed
under the Conservatives, as their view was that IPRs were
taking on an increased importance in the knowledge
economy and, according to Esmail and Kohler, under
them Canada's foreign policy became much more favor-
able to IPRs. As one example of the more aggressive policy
“the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade…announced in 2007 that it was assessing its
interests in protecting intellectual property as it initiated
trade agreements in Peru, Colombia and the Dominican
Republic” [17].
As a result of this stance, the conclusion of the review
was not, unexpectedly, that no amendments would be
made to CAMR to improve its functionality. This con-
clusion was reached despite the 2006 pronouncement by
Tony Clement, Conservative Minister of Health, that
CAMR was a flawed piece of legislation [20]. Instead the
government touted a series of measures it was taking
including providing tax incentives for pharmaceutical
donations to developing countries, giving $100,000 to
the University of Toronto’s program to improve access
to pharmaceuticals in Ghana and other West African
countries and its $450 million decade long African
Health Systems Initiative to support country-led efforts to
strengthen health systems, improve health outcomes and
make progress towards the Millennium Development
Goals [21]. The benefits from these government-lead
initiatives would have been a good complement to an
amended CAMR, a piece of legislation that would have
had a relatively quick and meaningful impact on access to
low-cost essential medicines, but they should not be seen
as a substitute for amending CAMR. The government
concluded the report by promising to monitor the situ-
ation with respect to CAMR and make amendments if
necessary.
The Conservatives had a chance to act on their prom-
ise of amending the act in 2011 when a private member’s
bill to amend and simplify CAMR came up for a vote.
There had not been any further use of CAMR since the
shipment to Rwanda and Apotex, the one generic com-
pany that had used the legislation, had stated that it
would not use it again in its current form [18]. Despite
passing the House of Commons, the bill was delayed by
the Conservatives in the Senate until it died with the
calling of an election. Tony Clement, who had switched
from Health Minister to Minister of Industry, sent a
highly misleading memo to Conservative members in
the Senate urging them to vote against the legislation on
the grounds that it “would allow drugs that have not
been certified by Health Canada to be shipped ‘tounsuspecting populations, to their detriment.’ The
drugs, he wrote, could be redirected to the black market
with proceeds going to non-humanitarian causes such as
weapons, and the shipments could run afoul of domestic
laws and traditions.” He further claimed that the legisla-
tion would lead to patent holders leaving Canada and
threatening Canadian research and development (R&D)
[22]. The inaccuracies in what Clement wrote are well
documented in a memo put out by the Canadian HIV/
AIDS Legal Network and the Grandmothers Advocacy
Network [23].
There was a second opportunity to amend the legisla-
tion in the fall of 2012, but with a few exceptions even
the Conservatives in the House of Commons who had
supported amending the legislation in 2011 yielded to
the pressure from the government and the almost unani-
mous vote by the Conservatives lead to the defeat of the
bill. The parliamentary secretary to the Defence Minister
maintained that there were better ways to help people
suffering from diseases in Africa and elsewhere, and once
again there were charges that Conservative Members of
Parliament were spreading misinformation about the
effects of the bill [24].United Nations high-level meeting on non-communicable
diseases
Over the past decade, there has been a growing recogni-
tion of the magnitude of the morbidity and mortality asso-
ciated with non-communicable diseases (NCDs) not just
in developed countries but also in developing countries.
Aside from some regions in Africa, the global burden of
disease from NCDs is greater than it is from infectious
diseases [25] and almost two-thirds of the 36.1 million
deaths per year from NCDs come from the poorest coun-
tries [26]. As a consequence of numbers such as these, in
September 2011 the United Nations convened a High-
Level meeting to come up with a strategy for how to deal
with NCDs. The main outcome of the meeting was a
political declaration on their prevention and control [27].
In the lead up to the meeting Canada was instrumental in
trying to weaken the final declaration by, among other
things, pressing for the exclusion of a pledge to support
universal health care, advocating for the removal of a
section about conflict-of-interest that would have limited
the involvement of food and alcohol companies in devel-
oping public health policies and in not addressing trade-
related barriers to global health. Although IPRs were not
directly mentioned in the statement, they are intimately
linked with trade as witnessed by the provisions of the
TRIPS agreement and the lack of any mention about
trade-related barriers could have a negative effect on the
ability of developing countries to access low-cost drugs for
NCDs.
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There is no doubt that counterfeit drugs are a significant
problem in developing countries. The World Health
Organization estimates that 10% of the drugs in these
countries may be counterfeit, [28] but the question is
complicated because of conflicting definitions of what
counterfeit means. As Attaran and colleagues [29] point
out, there are four groups of drugs that are often lumped
together as “counterfeits”. True counterfeits are products
that are felt to be in violation of IPRs because of alleged
violations of patents, trademarks or other forms of IPR.
Substandard drugs are ones that unintentionally do not
meet the necessary quality standards, perhaps because of
impure ingredients or manufacturing problems. Unregis-
tered medicines are those that are present in the country
without the authorization of the regulatory authority,
often because of theft or illegal diversion. Finally, delib-
erately falsified medicines are ones created with a crim-
inal intent to violate quality standards, e.g., by using fake
ingredients. The pharmaceutical industry is primarily in-
terested in taking action against drugs that violate their
IPRs, i.e., counterfeits, but for patients the main concern
is with drugs that do not meet quality and safety
standards, i.e., ones that will harm their health [30].
In 2006 Japan and the US started preliminary discus-
sions about an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA); in 2006 and 2007 these discussions were joined
by Canada, the EU and Switzerland and when formal
negotiations began in 2008 Australia, Korea, Mexico,
Morocco, New Zealand and Singapore were also parties.
However, rather than focusing on how to stop the trade
in medicines that might damage people’s health, the
main focus of ACTA has been on trade in medicines
that violate various forms of IPRs [31]. If enacted, the
various terms in ACTA could also negatively impact on
access to generic drugs in developing countries. The
border measures section excludes detaining products
because of patent violations but civil trademark infringe-
ments are included as a ground to detain generics pass-
ing in transit, i.e., going through a third country on the
way between the exporting and importing countries [32].
This concern about generics being detained is not
merely theoretical. The EU already has regulations about
goods in transit that are similar to those in ACTA. “In
2008 and 2009 there were at least 19 detentions by
customs authorities of medicines in transit through the
EU from the source country [usually India] to destinations
in Latin America and elsewhere…These detentions took
place under an EU regulation…that permitted action
against goods infringing intellectual property rights, inclu-
ding goods in transit…even though the products were not
patented in India or the destination country” [30]. Patents
are included in the civil enforcement section of the treaty
by default. Developing countries could exclude them, butthere is a well-grounded fear that these countries could be
pressured into adopting the default position of including
patents. Finally, “ACTA puts a broad group of third
parties at risk of criminal and civil enforcement measures,
including injunctions, provisional measures and claims for
high damages. In the trade in generics this group of third
parties can potentially include suppliers of active ingre-
dients for medicines or NGOs procuring and distributing
legitimate generics for treatment” [32].
Several of these concerns were raised in June 2009
when Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
(DFAIT) held a roundtable with various representatives
of civil society about ACTA. At the meeting, officials
from Canadian Border Services Agency stated that
seizures at Canadian borders of generic drugs that were
in transit were unlikely to happen due to Canada’s differ-
ing legislation and practices. With regards to the issue
that ACTA was only intended to deal with IPR issues
and not drugs that could compromise health, DFAIT’s
position was that “ACTA can make a contribution to the
fight against counterfeit medicines by establishing inter-
national standards for trademark enforcement, but only as
a part of Canada’s broader approach.” However, Canada is
not taking any initiatives to deal with substandard or
deliberately falsified medicines nor has it indicated its in-
tent to do so in any public fashion. In addition, DFAIT
was opposed to the idea of removing medicines from the
scope of ACTA because its view was that ACTA is a non-
sectoral agreement, i.e., an agreement about counterfeiting
in general, and removing pharmaceuticals would result in
lower sectoral enforcement standards [33].
Although the European Parliament overwhelmingly
rejected ACTA, [34] Canada has signed the agreement
although it is yet to be ratified [35].
Negotiations for TRIPS extension for least developed
countries
Least developed countries (LDCs), as defined by the
United Nations, are those with a gross domestic product
per capita of less than USD $905, human resource weak-
ness and economic vulnerability. Currently 49 countries
have this designation [36]. When the TRIPS agreement
came into force on January 1, 1995 LDCs were granted a
10-year exemption from complying with its provisions
and this exemption was subsequently extended to July 1,
2013. Separately, these countries were given an extension
until January 1, 2016 before they need to provide for or
enforce either patents or data protection (data protection
prevents generic companies from using the safety and
efficacy data produced by brand-name companies for a
specific period of time) for pharmaceutical products [37].
As the July 2013 deadline neared, the LDCs started lobby-
ing for an indefinite extension that would apply until a
country no longer fell into the LDC category [38]. This
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Commission on HIV and the Law that “WTO Members
must indefinitely extend the exemption for LDCs from
the application of TRIPS provisions in the case of pharma-
ceutical products” [39].
The US and the EU backed by a group of developed
countries including Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand
and Switzerland were opposed to an indefinite extension
and instead argued for a time limited extension of between
5 and 10 years. In addition, these countries were opposed
to the elimination of the “no rollback” condition that was
included in the 2005 extension [40]. This clause prevented
LDCs from repealing or revising any TRIPS related IPR
provisions that they had already implemented, thereby
preventing LDCs from being able to experiment with IPRs
that were appropriate for their level of development
[37,41]. The final compromise was for an 8-year extension.
Although the no rollback clause was not eliminated, LDCs
will be allowed to use the “flexibilities” in TRIPS to intro-
duce measures such as compulsory licensing, but only if
they “express their determination to preserve and continue
their progress towards implementing the TRIPS agree-
ment” [42]. The EU is already interpreting this phrase in a
much more restrictive manner than are the LDCs [43].
There is no similar requirement in the special exemption
for pharmaceutical products and therefore, if that special
exemption is not renewed, then come January 1, 2016
LDCs may have much more difficulty in being able to work
around the IPR requirements in TRIPS. Canada’s position
in this recent set of negotiations sets the stage for its likely
stance when the question of whether to extend the 2016
exemption, and what conditions will apply to an extension,
becomes an issue.
Summary
It would be a mistake to conclude that Canada has not
done anything to help improve access to medications in
developing countries. Between 2001 and 2010 Canada
contributed over USD $874,000,000 to the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria ranking it 7th
among individual country donors [44]. However, when-
ever there has been a conflict between access and
supporting IPRs, the Canadian government regardless of
its political leanings, has either been neutral as in the
South African court case or consistently backed strong
IPRs. The “goals of protecting intellectual property and
ensuring good trade relations with the United States”
have taken precedence over the need for safe, low cost
medications in poor countries [17]. The supremacy of
IPRs over access shows the triumph of neoliberalism, in
the form of individual property rights, over collective
security through access to medications.
The Canadian prioritization of IPRs internationally is a
reflection of what has been happening domestically inCanada for over 25 years. The increased emphasis on
IPRs by Canadian governments is matched by promises
from the pharmaceutical industry about increased R&D
investment contingent on stronger IPRs [45,46]. This
process started with the weakening of compulsory licen-
sing for the domestic production of generic drugs in
1987 [45] and progressed through the abolition of
compulsory licensing in 1993, [47] the imposition of the
Notice of Compliance regulations, also in 1993, that can
delay the appearance of generic drugs for up to 24
months [48] and the 2006 extension of the data protec-
tion period to between 8 and 8.5 years [49]. The ration-
ale behind all of these decisions has been to encourage
pharmaceutical investment in R&D in Canada. However,
between 2010 and 2013 seven major multinational phar-
maceutical companies have closed research facilities in
Canada with a loss of over 1000 jobs [50]. The disinvest-
ment emphasizes the fact that the strength of IPRs is
only one of many factors that influence decisions when
it comes to direct foreign investment by pharmaceutical
companies [51]. According to a study looking at the
prospects for national drug insurance in Canada, the
Canadian government’s stance on IPRs has lead to the
country having the 3rd or 4th most expensive brand
name products among 8 major developed countries [52].
Finally, spending on R&D by the brand-name companies
is 6.7% of sales putting Canada in virtually the same pos-
ition it was in in 1988 [53].
Internationally, the expectation by the Canadian gov-
ernment that the poorest countries in the world should
adopt IPRs that are equivalent to those in wealthy devel-
oped countries ignores both historical and current eco-
nomic realities. Many major western countries including
Canada, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland did not
adopt full IPRs for pharmaceuticals until the 1970s and
1980s when their gross domestic product per capita was
in the range of USD $16,000 to $36,000 [54]. Expecting
the same from countries with a GDP of less USD $1000
is folly. In the words of the Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights “It is our contention that intellectual
property systems may, if we are not careful, introduce
distortions that are detrimental to the interests of de-
veloping countries. Very ‘high’ standards of protection
may be in the public interest in developed countries
with highly sophisticated scientific and technological
infrastructures…but this does not mean the same
standards are appropriate in all developing coun-
tries…so far as possible developing countries should
not be deprived of the flexibility to design their IP
systems that developed countries enjoyed in earlier
stages of their own development, and higher IP stan-
dards should not be pressed on them without a ser-
ious and objective assessment of their development
impact” [55].
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the LDCs the opposite is true. Between 1975 and 2004
only 21 out of 1556 marketed new chemical entities
were indicated for the neglected diseases that occur
largely or exclusively in the LDCs [56]. In the first half
of the 2000s, 5 out of 12 of the top multinational com-
panies were not conducting any research on neglected
diseases and these companies were unwilling to enter
this area regardless of any incentives offered to them
[57]. Speaking to a reporter from the Financial Times,
Daniel Vasella, then the CEO of Novartis, said “We have
no model which would (meet) the need for new drugs in
a sustainable way … You can't expect for-profit organi-
zation[s] to do this on a large scale. If you want to esta-
blish a system where companies systematically invest in
this kind of area, you need a different system” [58].
While patent protection in developed countries leads to
more R&D in some countries, although not all as the
Canadian data shows, for developing countries there is
no relationship between patent protection and invest-
ment in R&D [59]. In addition, “the introduction of
patents in developing countries has not been followed
by greater R&D investment in the diseases that are most
prevalent there” [60]. Similarly, there is no relationship
between whether a country adopts data exclusivity and
the amount of investment by the pharmaceutical indus-
try in the country [61].
The decisions about expanding access to essential
medicines by Canadian governments over the past dec-
ade and a half have been motivated by a free market
ideology that prioritizes private property in the form of
IPRs. As a result, Canada has failed in its humanitarian
duty to protect the human right to health in the form of
safe and low cost medicines for the people in developing
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